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The aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the impact of the capital structure of a start-
up on the probability of being accepted into an accelerator program. Due the fact that it 
is a recent topic, there is a lack of research on the preferences of accelerator’s directors in 
terms of the financing structure of start-ups. After building a sample of firms which 
applied to accelerators between 2016 and 2017, from a novel database provided by the 
Emory University in Atlanta, United States of America, we conducted Tobit and Probit 
analyses to assess the relationship between the capital structure of a start-up and the 
probability of being accepted in an accelerator program. Our results suggest that start-ups 
with higher levels of own equity, external equity and debt have higher chances of being 
accepted in accelerators. In terms of sources of funding, accelerator’s directors prefer 
start-ups with higher proportion of external equity in their capital structure. 
 
KEYWORDS: Accelerators; Start-ups; Entrepreneurial Finance; Capital Structure; 
Accelerators’ Selection Process. 















O objetivo desta dissertação é avaliar o impacto da estrutura de capital de uma start-
up na probabilidade de esta ser aceite em programas de aceleração de empresas. Em 
virtude de se tratar de um tema recente, não existe literatura anterior sobre as preferências 
dos responsáveis pelos programas de aceleração relativamente à estrutura de 
financiamento das start-ups. Depois de selecionada uma amostra de empresas que se 
candidataram a aceleradoras entre 2016 e 2017, de uma base de dados fornecida pela 
Universidade Emory em Atlanta, Estados Unidos da América, utilizamos modelos de 
Tobit e Probit para avaliar a relação existente entre a estrutura de capital de uma empresa 
e a probabilidade de esta ser aceite em aceleradoras. Os resultados sugerem que start-ups 
com níveis mais altos de capitais dos fundadores, capitais próprios externos e dívida, têm 
maior probabilidade ser aceites em aceleradoras. Analisando as proporções relativas de 
cada fonte de financiamento, as aceleradoras preferem start-ups cuja maioria do capital 
seja proveniente de capitais próprios externos. 
 
Palavras-chave: Acceleradoras; Start-ups; Empreendedorismo Financeiro; Estrutura 
de Capitais; Processo de Seleção de Acceleradoras. 
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The importance of start-up’s initial financial capital is well established in the previous 
literature. Financial support has an important role in the entrepreneurial activities (Pan 
and Yang, 2018). In fact, the financial capital determines start-up’s size (Brüderl et al., 
1992), growth (Cooper et al., 1994; Colombo and Grilli, 2005), and survival.1 Ventures 
with greater financial resources can overcome temporary hardships or managerial 
mistakes more easily. Financial capital allows firms to increase their legitimacy among 
stockholders, acquire better resources and technology, and start operation at a larger scale.  
The choice of funding (e.g. own equity, outside equity or debt) may also signal its value 
to investors and other external entities, reducing information asymmetries and agency 
problems (Ross, 1977; Tomboc, 2013). The capital structure not only signals the real 
value of a start-up, but also the growing perspectives, new profitable projects, the level 
of commitment of the entrepreneurs with the start-up and financial distress costs (Brealey, 
Leland and Pyle, 1977; Cassar, 2004; Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984; Myers, 2001).  
But, does the amount of financial capital also influence the probability of being accepted 
into start-up accelerators?  
Start-up accelerators, also known as seed accelerator programs, are educational 
programs of limited duration created to support start-ups2 in their early stages of life. In 
these programs, established firms and experienced entrepreneurs assist new entrepreneurs 
by providing funding, business advice, mentorship and networking connections (Cohen, 
2013).  Although they share some characteristics of business incubators, accelerators 
differ in terms of duration, business model, start-up’s selection process and education 
provided (Isabelle, 2013).3 Their exhaustive selection process implies that only a few 
start-ups are accepted (Caley and Kula, 2013). Previous studies find that the selection 
decision is determined by entrepreneur’s motivations, objectives, academic background, 
previous entrepreneurial and working experience and start-up’s growth potential, 
                                                 
1 Bates (1990); Brüderl et al., (1992); Cooper et al., (1994); Astebro and Bernhardt (2003); Headd 
(2003); Hvide and Moen (2008). 
2 In this study, we define start-ups as nascent firms aimed to develop new opportunities to the market 
and launch innovative products and services, in an environment of uncertainty (Hoffman and Radojevich-
Kelley, 2012). 
3 For detailed information on business incubators, please see Grimaldi and Grandi (2005).  
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intellectual property and size (Yin and Luo, 2018). Until now, to the best of our 
knowledge, little is known about start-up’s financial capital and accelerator’s selection 
process.  
In our study, we contribute to this literature by assessing the importance of the capital 
structure of a start-up in the selection process of an accelerator. More specifically, we 
examine the relationship between the proportion of entrepreneurs’ own capital, outside 
equity and debt in the capital structure of start-ups and their acceptance rate into an 
accelerator. Our research questions are the following: Does the amount of financial capital 
raised by a start-up affect the probability of being accepted into an accelerator program? 
Which source of funding will increase their chances of being accepted? 
To address these questions, we use a novel database, the Entrepreneurship Database 
Program, from Emory University in Atlanta. From this database, we select all for-profit 
start-ups that applied to accelerator programs between 2016 and 2017, in which we have 
information about the start-up’s capital structure and characteristics of the founding team. 
We find that the amount of financial capital positively affects the probability of a 
start-up being accepted into an accelerator. However, when comparing the sources of 
funding, we find that accelerators prefer start-ups with higher proportion of external 
capital, in detriment of own equity and debt. 
This study has important practical implications. For entrepreneurs who intend to apply 
for such programs, this study suggest that their chances of being accepted increase when 
they raise external equity. For public policy, this study suggests that the governments 
should create mechanisms to support those applying start-ups, such as credit lines for new 
entrepreneurs, subsidies and fiscal incentives for accelerator’s founders. 
This dissertation is structured as follows: section II reviews the relevant literature on 
accelerators and entrepreneurial finance; section III presents our theory and hypotheses 
to be tested; section IV describes the data, sample and the relevant variables; in section V 






2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since accelerators are a relatively recent phenomenon, only a few studies have 
analysed the role of accelerators and their main characteristics (Cohen and Hochberg, 
2014).  In this section, we review the most relevant studies, concerning accelerators by 
differentiating them from business incubators and by defining its main benefits and 
disadvantages.  
 
2.1. Main Characteristics of Accelerators 
As previously mentioned, accelerators are educational programs of limited duration 
with the objective of assisting early stage firms establishing successfully in the market 
(Cohen, 2013) (Shankar and Shepherd, 2018)4. These programs are created by private 
investors, who intend to profit while helping start-ups to develop their new business ideas 
(Malek, Maine and McCarthy, 2013). The duration of program varies between three to 
six months, since most of the accepted start-ups are technology based. Hoffman and 
Radojevich-kelley (2012) finds that accelerators usually invest in technology-based start-
ups with cut edge technology and products with international appeal. The programs 
operate in cohorts of start-ups, which allows the entrepreneurs to share knowledge and 
previous business experiences with other founders. 
To apply to accelerators, start-ups must go through a very competitive selection 
process, in which the accelerator’s directors interview the entrepreneurs to evaluate the 
business idea, the background of the start-ups and of their founders, as well as founder’s 
motivations and start-up’s growth potential (Miller and Bound, 2011). At the firm level, 
they also assess if the product or service is innovative, the market in which the firm will 
operate, the existence of patents and trademarks, the willingness of the customers to 
acquire the product or service and the growth potential of the firm and its sustainability 
(Yin and Luo, 2018). Once the start-ups are accepted, the accelerator’s directors invest 
capital in each start-up, also known as pre-seed investment. Accelerators prefer to invest 
in start-ups formed by teams instead of a single entrepreneur, nevertheless, each team 
                                                 
4 Accelerators help start-ups in the stage, where they most frequently fail (Battistella, Toni and Pessot, 
2016). 
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usually does not have more than four elements (Miller and Bound, 2011). At the end of 
the program, there is a demo-day, for entrepreneurs to introduce their start-up and present 
their business idea to potential investors (Miller and Bound, 2011; Clarysse, Wright and 
Hove, 2015). 
Some studies compare accelerators with business incubators, in the sense that they 
help new ventures in their early stage and allow the program participants to connect with 
a network of investors (Malek, Maine and McCarthy, 2013). However, there are some 
differences between them. First, they differ in terms of duration. Accelerators usually last 
between three to six months while incubators vary from one to five years. The business 
model of accelerators consists on an investment provided by the accelerator’s director, 
which expect to profit from it, while the business model of incubators is based on office 
renting paid by the entrepreneurs. The selection process of accelerators is very 
competitive, unlike the selection process of incubators (Cohen and Hochberg, 2014). The 
type of education offered is also different. In accelerators, there are regular seminars 
where entrepreneurs learn core concepts about business such as finance, management and 
marketing. In contrast, incubators only provide some legal information punctually 
(Isabelle, 2013; Cohen and Hochberg, 2014).  
 
2.2. Benefits and Disadvantages of Accelerators 
Accelerators create a propitious environment for the entrepreneurs to develop their 
business ideas and to focus on innovation, while accelerators manage business related 
issues, such as financing, management and networking (Sharma, Joshi, Shukla, 2014). 
The main advantages of accelerators are funding, business advice, mentorship and 
networking connections and credibility (Cohen, 2013).  
Accelerators first appeared to overcome the financial capital’s needs of start-ups 
(Hoffman and Radojevich-Kelley, 2012). In fact, Christiansen (2009) and Miller and 
Bound (2011) consider that access to financial capital is the most appealing benefit of 
accelerators, since the capital provided in these programs is fundamental for the 
development of the start-ups. In fact, following the financial crisis, accelerators became 
an important source of funding for new entrepreneurs.  In contrast, bank’s regulation 
became stronger and credit concession for new start-ups became more restricted (Block, 
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Colombo, Cumming and Vismara, 2017).  Accelerator’s unique networks also positively 
contribute for subsequent funding after the boot-camp ends (Christiansen, 2009; Miller 
and Bound, 2011). 
The mentorship that entrepreneurs receive in accelerators allows them to learn from 
past experiences of the mentors, avoid making the same mistakes and focus on the main 
issues of the project (Clarysse and Yusubova, 2014; Mejia and Gopal, 2015).  The 
mentor’s experience allows them to find the strengths and weaknesses of the participating 
start-ups, to advise them about the most accurate strategies, opportunities and business 
plans to follow (Wise, Valliere, 2014). 
Accelerators have an important role on reducing the asymmetric information problem 
since accelerator’s directors evaluate the participating start-ups during the selection 
process and have an accurate perception about the potential and fair value of the firms 
accelerated (Kim and Wagman, 2011). Thus, participating in an accelerator gives a signal 
to the market that the start-up is worth investing, reducing the gap of information about 
the true value and potential of the entrepreneurial firm between investors and 
entrepreneurs.  
Accelerators bring advantages not only for start-ups and entrepreneurs, but also for 
accelerator’s directors (Hoffman and Radojevich-Kelley, 2012). Accelerator’s directors 
have interest in the success of the start-ups that participate in the programs, since they 
receive equity in exchange for capital (Christiansen, 2009). In the case of technology 
accelerators, participating start-ups may also use the technology provided by the 
accelerators (Miller and Bound, 2011). Accelerator’s directors have also strategic 
objectives when they host accelerators (Kanbach and Stubner, 2016). The directors might 
integrate the start-ups, which get improved after participating in their programs. 
Supporting start-ups is a good vehicle for large and already established firms to get 
involved in innovation projects and have access to the ultimate market trends, 
technologies and innovation (Christiansen, 2009; Kanbach and Stubner, 2016). 
Despite their benefits, accelerators also present a few problems (Miller and Bound, 
2011). Accelerators usually target entrepreneurs who aim to sell their start-ups. Therefore, 
accelerators become restricted to a number of start-ups and exclude entrepreneurs who 
desire to develop their start-ups on an ongoing basis. The limited duration of accelerators 
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is also an issue. The period of the program may be insufficient for the entrepreneurs to 
develop their business idea and to build their business (Chang, 2013). At the end of the 
program, start-ups are relatively recent and may not be sufficiently mature and the 
entrepreneurs might not be prepared to run the business (Miller and Bound, 2011). 
Moreover, Miller and Bound (2011) add that the amount of equity received by the 
accelerator’s directors may not be fair according to their contribution and effectiveness 
of accelerators program. Entrepreneurs must compare the costs of forgoing equity, such 
as, dispersion of the shareholders’ structure and loss of control in the firm, with the 
advantages and benefits inherent to accelerators (Chang, 2013). This is particularly 
relevant, for accelerators with weaker reputation (Wright, 2017). In terms of mentoring, 
accelerators usually copy what other accelerators do and consequently, fail to understand 
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3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we develop the hypotheses on the impact of the start-up’s financing 
structure in the accelerator’s selection process. We are interested in studying the influence 
that founders’ own equity, outside equity and debt have on the acceptance rate of 
accelerator programs. 
Tables 1 and 2 present the most relevant theories about the signalling effects of the 
financing structure. The financing sources available to a start-up are debt and equity (Berk 
and DeMarzo, 2010). While equity is a permanent source of capital, which represent the 
investment made by the owners, debt is the capital loaned by other parties and eventually 
it will be repaid (Coleman and Robb, 2012). Initially, founders fund their start-ups with 
equity financing, investing their own savings and their relatives’ capital and subsequently 
seek for outside investors such as angel investors and venture capitalists. In terms of 
external capital, start-ups raise, firstly, funds from angel investors and only in a 
subsequent stage obtain funds from venture capitalists, which, usually, provide larger 
amounts of capital (Wong et al., 2009). As the start-up evolves to a greater dimension, 
with a more complex structure of shareholders and a higher level of reputation, it will 
search for debt financing (Cosh, Cumming and Hughes, 2009). The capital structure of 
the start-ups includes the combination of these several sources of funding (Myers, 2010) 
and, it depends on start-up’s size, asset structure, legal organization, owners’ 
characteristics and growth perspectives (Cassar, 2004; Kurshev and Strebulaev, 2007; 
Fraser, Bhaumik and Wright, 2015).5  
The lack of assets that can be used as collateral, the scarce years of operations and 
uncertainty about future profitability prevent start-ups from raising debt, therefore, they 
often prefer to raise equity financing (Denis, 2004). Start-ups face the agency and 
information asymmetries problems. The information asymmetries problem arises because 
start-up’s founders possess a wider knowledge about the potential of their business and a 
better understanding of its quality than outside investors. In fact, investors are unable to 
make an accurate assessment of the firm and reach an agreement with the entrepreneurs 
                                                 
5 The pecking order and the life cycle theory contributes to explain the financing decision (Fraser, 
Bhaumik and Wright, 2015). The pecking order theory suggest that start-ups choose internal funds first, 
once it is less expensive, and then seek external sources such as equity and debt. It also says that profitable 
firms tend to use more internal funds because their owners shall be interested in investing in the firm (Myers 
and Majluf, 1984). 
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about the firm’s value (Tomboc, 2013). When firms incur in external financing, a conflict 
of interests arise, in the sense that the founder may use such funds on his own benefit, 
contrary to the investor’s objectives. This is known in the literature as the agency problem 
(Denis, 2004). 
Founder’s choice for the capital structure of a start-up may mitigate these problems 
(Ross, 1977). The founders have better information about the true value of the start-up, 
and when they invest their own capital in the start-up, they are expecting higher future 
cash flows than the current firm value. This information signals that the start-up is worth 
investing, reducing the problem of information asymmetries (Brealey, Leland and Pyle, 
1977). When entrepreneurs own a high share of the start-up, they are more committed to 
make the firm grow and prosper (Ahlers, Cumming, Gunther and Schweizer, 2015). On 
the other hand, founder’s own capital may serve as a signal to the market, reflecting the 
commitment of the founding team and the quality of the business idea. In fact, higher 
proportion of founder’s own capital indicates that the firm is more profitable and is 
expected to generate higher cash flows (Vermaelen, 1981). We apply the same argument 
to the accelerator director’s selection decision. When they are evaluating start-ups, they 
may look at the share of own equity as a signal information about the business quality. 
Entrepreneurs of higher quality will usually invest more of their own money (Brealey, 
Leland and Pyle, 1977). Moreover, ventures with larger own capital will have larger 
resources to use as collateral to secure external funding (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Therefore, we assume: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Start-ups with higher share of own equity in the capital structure will 
have higher chances of being accepted into an accelerator. 
 
Previous literature is not unanimous relatively to the signalling effect of outside equity. 
In one hand, issuing outside financing indicates that the firm is growing and needs more 
capital to finance its projects (Cassar, Holmes, 2003; Asquith Mullins, 1986). More 
dynamic start-ups, with higher growth potential, more credibility and in more advanced 
stages of their life-cycle, tend to incur in more external financing (Fraser, Bhaumik and 
Wright, 2015). Larger start-ups are less likely to fail, since they generate more cash flows 
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than smaller firms. Also, the size of a start-up affects its financing structure due the 
economies of scale in lowering asymmetric information, transaction costs, market access 
and risk exposure (Cassar, 2004). Furthermore, firms that raised external capital had to 
go already through a selection and monitoring process from outside investors. Due to their 
competitive and highly selective process, only few firms raise external equity (Fluck, 
1998).  
On the other hand, outside equity may represent a negative signal due the loss of 
incentives from the management team (the initial owners of the start-up) to maximize the 
activities, operations and profits of the firm. When managers do not own the full capital 
of the firm, they have less incentive to maximize the interests of the company.  However, 
external capital entities implement several mechanisms to align founder’s and venture’s 
interest (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Moreover, it may also indicate the firm is 
overpriced (Asquith Mullins, 1986), which implies that the founder intends to sell the 
start-up at a higher price than its net present value (NPV) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984). Nevertheless, considering the reputation and 
monitoring process of external equity entities, accelerator’s director will probably take 
more into consideration the positive signals. Therefore, we expect: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Start-ups with higher share of external equity in the capital structure 
will have higher chances of being accepted into an accelerator. 
 
When start-ups raise debt, they are already in a later stage of their firm’s life cycle 
and the accelerator program are fitted to early stage ventures, when they are still testing 
their business models. When start-ups incur in debt funding, they must go through a 
process of risk analysis and regular scrutiny to ensure that firm’s activities are regularly 
supervised (Ross, 1977). Besides, growing start-ups need more leverage to finance its 
operations, which is positive and means that the firm has growing perspectives (Berger 
and Udell, 1998). Another benefit inherent to debt financing is the tax shields firms 
obtain, since the interest expenses paid, reduce the amount of profits subject to taxes, 
decreasing the tax value the firms owe (Myers, 2001). However, debt is also associated 
to higher financial distress costs (Myers, 2001). The author argues that the higher the 
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value of debt in the financing structure of a firm, the higher the costs of bankruptcy, and 
consequently the higher the agency costs. All of this may have a negative impact when 
accelerators directors are evaluating the applying start-ups. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Start-ups with higher share of debt in their capital structure have lower 
probability of being accepted into an accelerator. 
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4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1. Data 
Our data comes from a novel database, the Entrepreneurship Database Program from 
Emory University in Atlanta, United States of America. The Entrepreneurship Database 
Program records information on the entrepreneurs who applied to several accelerator 
programs. These entrepreneurs respond every six months to a questionnaire to update 
their information. The database includes information on start-up applicants between 2013 
and 2017, surveying more than 13,495 early-stage ventures and 175 accelerator programs. 
This dataset surveys accepted and rejected start-ups from 150 countries worldwide and it 
has information at the firm and founders’ level. 
At the firm level, the survey includes information on the start-up’s country of 
headquarters, number of founders, number of employees, presence in social media and 
webpage, year of foundation, legal status, innovation (copyrights, patents and 
trademarks), revenues, if the start-up was previously accelerated and the sources of 
financing (own capital, equity, debt and philanthropic).  At the entrepreneurs’ level, the 




From Entrepreneurship Database Program database, we select all for-profit start-ups 
which applied to an accelerator program between 2016 and 2017. The database only 
disclosures information on the acceptance of the firm in the accelerator program since 
2016. Then, we exclude start-ups with missing information on start-up’s and founder’s 
characteristics and we restricted our sample to the start-ups established by founders aged 
between 20 and 70 years old. We end up with a sample of 3,649 start-up observations, 
with information of 8,228 founders. 
 
4.3. Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 describes the variables used in this study and Tables 4 and 5 present the 
descriptive statistics of our sample. 
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The majority of the start-ups in our sample are accepted into an accelerator program. 
Approximately 80 percent of the start-ups are accepted.  Relatively to start-up’s 
characteristics, each start-up has, on average, 3 founders, 33 employees and a value of 
revenues of approximately 292,913$. In terms of capital structure, own equity, external 
equity and a debt account for 23 percent, 55 percent and 22 percent, respectively. 
Furthermore, 89 percent have a website and/or social media, 53 percent possess 
intellectual property and 37 percent were previously accelerated. In terms of founder’s 
characteristics, entrepreneurs, on average, are male (72 percent) and have 35.6 years of 
age. In terms of experience, 67 percent of the start-ups in our sample have, at least, one 
founder with entrepreneurial experience and 92 percent with working experience. 
Relatively to education degree, 91 percent have, at least, one founder with a Bachelor, 
Master or Doctoral degree and only 9 percent of the start-ups have founders with the high 
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5. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
In this section, we evaluate the impact of the levels of capital and the financing structure 
on the accelerator’s selection process. In order to test the effect of the amount of own 
equity, outside equity and debt in the probability of a start-up being accepted into an 
accelerator, we conduct a Logit and a Probit model by estimating equation (1). To assess 
which source of funding increases the chance of start-up being accepted we estimate 
equations (2) and (3): 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑠,𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑠
´ + 𝜃𝑍𝑓
´ + 𝛿1ln(𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛿2 ln(𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦)
+ 𝛿3 ln(𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡) + 𝑠,𝑓  
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑠,𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑠
´ + 𝜃𝑍𝑓
´ + 𝛿1𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛿2𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑠,𝑓 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑠,𝑓 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑠
´ + 𝜃𝑍𝑓
´ + 𝛿1 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 𝛿2𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑠,𝑓 
Where s is the applying start-up and f refers to the founder. 
 
Our dependent variable is accepted, a dummy variable, equalling one if a start-up is 
accepted in an accelerator program and zero otherwise. 
The variables of interest in our model are lntotalownequity, calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the total own equity; lntotalexternalequity, computed as the natural 
logarithm of the total external equity; lntotaldebt, calculated as the natural logarithm of 
the total debt; ownequitypercent, computed as the ratio between the total value of own 
equity and the total assets; externalequitypercent, calculated as the ratio between the total 
amount of external equity and the total assets; and debtpercent, computed as the ratio of 
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As suggested by the previous literature, we include the most relevant factors that 
influence the acceptance rate of the accelerator’s directors. The vector of firm’s 
characteristics, 𝑋𝑠
´   includes: size measured by the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees; lnrev measured by the logarithm of the total revenues of the previous year; 
the number of founders; intproperty (dummy variable equalling one if the firm has 
patents, trademarks and/or copyrights and zero otherwise);  websitesocialmedia (dummy 
variable equalling one if the start-up has facebook/tweeter/linkedin and/or website, and 
zero otherwise); lnnrfounders measured as the natural logarithm of the total number of 
founders of each start-up; lnagestartup computed as the natural logarithm of the number 
of years of activity of the start-up; prevaccelerated (dummy variable equalling one if the 
start-up has been accelerated before and zero otherwise) and four categorical variables 
for profitability: profitability_dum1 (dummy variable equalling one if the profitability is 
between 0 percent and 5 percent and zero otherwise), profitability_dum2 (dummy 
variable equalling one if the profitability is between 6 percent and 10percent and zero 
otherwise), profitability_dum3 (dummy variable equalling one if the profitability is 
between 11 percent and 15 percent and zero otherwise), profitability_dum4 (dummy 
variable equalling one if the profitability is between 16 percent and 20 percent and zero 
otherwise), profitability_dum5 (dummy variable equalling one if the profitability is 
higher than 20 percent and zero otherwise); profitability_dum6 (taking the value one if 
the start-up had a negative ROI and zero otherwise).  
The founder characteristics vector, 𝑍𝑓
´ , includes the following variables: lnmale 
(natural logarithm of the number of male founders); entrepexper (dummy variable 
equalling 1 if, at least, one founder per start-up has entrepreneurial experience and 0 
otherwise); jobexper (dummy variable equalling one if, at least, one founder has working 
experience and zero otherwise); and education level measured with three categorical 
variables: higheducation (dummy variable equalling one when start-ups reported, at least 
one founder with bachelor, master or doctoral degree and zero otherwise), 
mediumeducation (dummy variable assuming the value one for start-ups which reported 
that the highest education level completed by their founders is high school or vocational 
degree and zero otherwise) and loweducation (dummy variable equalling one for start-
ups in which founders have not completed a degree higher than elementary, middle or 
primary school and zero otherwise). 
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 We include fixed effects at the accelerator program, country, and sector of activity. 
Standard errors are clustered at the accelerator program level. 
Table 6 presents the results of the estimated regression (1) using the Logit and Probit 
models. 
The Logit estimates suggest a positive effect of the total amount of own equity of a 
start-up and its acceptance rate in an accelerator program. An increase of the amount of 
own equity leads to an increase, ceteris paribus, in the probability of the start-up being 
accepted in an accelerator. This result confirms the arguments that in firms with higher 
levels of own equity, entrepreneurs are more committed with the start-up (Ahlers, 
Cummings, Gunther and Schweizer, 2015), own equity is a positive signal about the 
quality of the firm (Leland and Pyle, 1977) and firms with more own equity possess more 
resources to use as collateral (Berger and Udell, 1998). Relatively to the amount of 
outside equity, there seems to have, as well, a positive relationship with the probability 
of the start-up being accepted into accelerators. According to our results, an increase in 
the amount of total outside equity corresponds to an increase, ceteris paribus, in the 
probability of being accepted. This is according to the theory that start-ups with higher 
amounts of external equity correspond to growing start-ups needing more capital to 
develop their projects (Cassar and Holmes, 2003) and more outside equity is associated 
to larger start-ups, benefiting from economies of scale, less asymmetric information, 
lower transaction costs and easier access to markets (Cassar, 2004). The total amount of 
debt has a positive impact in the probability of a start-up being accepted into an 
accelerator program. An increase in the total amount of debt leads to an increase, ceteris 
paribus, in the chances of the start-up to be accepted. These results corroborate that firms 
which incur in debt financing are subject to a process of risk analysis and regular scrutiny 
(Ross, 1977), firms which need to be leveraged have growing perspectives (Berger and 
Udell, 1998) and benefits of tax shields associated to higher levels of debt (Myers, 2001).  
The results we obtained with the Probit model confirm the results we described 
previously. The total amount of own equity, external equity and debt have a positive effect 
in the probability of a start-up being accepted in an accelerator program. 
Table 7 presents the results of the estimated regressions (2) and (3), using the Logit 
model. 
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The estimates from equation (2) suggest a positive relationship between the share of 
external equity and the chances of a start-up being accepted into an accelerator program. 
An increase of the share of external equity is associated to an increase, ceteris paribus, in 
the probability of the start-up being accepted. This result is according with the theory that 
firms which raised outside equity have already passed through a monitoring and 
assessment process from outside investors (Fluck, 1998), and for that reason are more 
appealing for accelerators’ directors. On the other hand, higher amounts of debt have a 
negative impact on the acceptance rate of start-ups, but it is not statistically significant. 
An increase of the share of debt in the capital structure corresponds to a decrease, ceteris 
paribus, in the probability of the start-up to be accepted into accelerators. This confirms 
that higher levels of debt are associated to financial distress costs and firms with more 
debt are subject to higher bankruptcy costs and agency costs (Myers, 2001). 
The results from regression (3), confirm the positive relationship between the share 
of outside equity and the chances of a start-up to be accepted in accelerators that we 
achieved with regression (2). According to the results obtained in regression (3) an 
increase of the share of outside equity leads to an increase, ceteris paribus, in the 
probability of the start-up to be accepted into an accelerator program. Relatively to the 
effect of the share of own equity in acceptance rate of a start-up in accelerators, the results 
from equation (3) suggest that start-ups with higher share of own equity in their capital 
structure tend to have lower acceptance rates in accelerator programs. A start-up with 
more own equity share has less probability, ceteris paribus, of being accepted in an 
accelerator program. These results indicate that despite the positive signals associated to 
higher levels of own equity, described above, the assessment process that start-ups are 
subject when issue outside equity and the reputation of external entities have a greater 
impact in the selection process. 
Table 8 presents the results of the estimated regressions (2) and (3), using the Probit 
model. 
The results we obtained using the Probit model confirm the results we described 
previously. Start-ups with higher share of outside equity tend to have higher chances of 
being accepted into accelerator programs than start-ups with higher share of own equity 
or debt. 
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Considering the results described above, we tend to reject our hypothesis 1, since 
start-ups with higher share of own capital seem to have lower chances of being accepted 
into accelerator programs. We do not reject our hypothesis 2, since start-ups with higher 
share of external equity tend to have higher rates of acceptance in accelerators. Start-ups 
with higher share of debt seem to have lower probabilities of being accepted into an 
accelerator program, thus we tend to reject our hypothesis 3. 
We are able then to answer to our research questions. In the first place, the amount of 
financial capital raised by a start-up affects the probability of being accepted into an 
accelerator program, confirmed by our results from regression (1). Moreover, external 
equity is the source of financing which increases the chances of a start-up to be accepted 












The aim of this research is to study the relationship between the financing structure 
of a start-up and the probability of being accepted in an accelerator program. Thus, we 
selected a sample based on novel database provided by the Emory University in Atlanta, 
United States of America, containing information of start-ups which have applied to 
accelerator programs between 2016 and 2017.  
Then we performed a multiple regression analysis, using Logit and Probit models, in 
order to estimate, firstly, the impact of the total amount of own equity, external equity 
and debt on the probability of a start-up being accepted in accelerators, and then to assess 
which source of funding increases its chance of being accepted. 
The results we achieved lead us to conclude that there is a positive relationship 
between the total amount of own equity, external equity and debt and the probability of a 
start-up being accepted into accelerators, which means that the amount of financial capital 
raised by a start-up affects the probability of being accepted. However, when we studied 
the impact of the proportion of own equity, external equity and debt, we conclude that 
start-ups with higher share of external capital tend to be preferred by accelerators’ 
directors, comparing to start-ups with higher share of own equity or debt. With these 
results we also conclude that accelerators’ directors prefer start-ups with higher levels of 
capital, and firms with larger share of external equity in their capital structure, in 
detriment of start-ups with higher share of own equity or debt.  
This study intends to fulfil a gap in the existent literature and is a contribute to the 
literature about entrepreneurial finance and is particularly relevant for start-ups which 
intend to apply to accelerator programs. Our research indicates that entrepreneurs should 
raise external equity before applying to accelerators in terms of economic policy. It is also 
relevant in terms of economic policy, in the sense that it suggests that Governments 
should create mechanisms to assist applying start-ups, such as fiscal benefits and 
subsidies for accelerators’ founders and credit lines for new entrepreneurs.  
This study has, however, some limitations that is important to take in consideration. 
Our research is based on a sample of start-ups that may not be fully representative in 
JOÃO MARIA A. JORGE  FINANCIAL CAPITAL AND ACCELERATORS 
19 
 
terms of the characteristics we want to study, which may compromise the statistical 
significance of our results, as well as the fact that accelerators are a quite recent 
phenomenon, with few records of information about start-ups and entrepreneurs that 
applied to accelerators which lead us to exclude a few start-ups, and only considering 
start-ups which applied form 2016 onwards. 
For future research, it would be interesting to have a depth study about other factors 
that influence the selection process of start-ups in accelerator programs, as well as more 
studies on the relationship between the capital structure of a start-up and the accelerator 
selection process, upgrading the available information about start-ups and entrepreneurs 
that applied to accelerator programs.   
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cumulative average 
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(1998). 
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cycle. 
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literature on private 
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markets. 
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Myers (2001). Capital structure. 
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effects of financial 
distress costs of high 
levels of debt. 
JOÃO MARIA A. JORGE  FINANCIAL CAPITAL AND ACCELERATORS 
27 
 














































































JOÃO MARIA A. JORGE  FINANCIAL CAPITAL AND ACCELERATORS 
28 
 
Table 3: Description of the variables 
Dependent Variable Description 
Accepted Start-up 
(ACCEPTED) 
Dummy variable equalling 1 if the start-up is accepted 
in the accelerator and 0 otherwise 
Independent Variables  
Start-up´s Total Own Equity 
(LNTOTALOWNEQUITY) 
Natural logarithm of the total own equity  
Start-up´s Total External Equity 
(LNTOTALEXTERNALQUITY) 
Natural logarithm of the total external equity 
Start-up´s Total Debt 
(LNTOTALDEBT) 
Natural logarithm of the total debt 
Start-up´s Proportion of Own 
Equity 
(OWNEQUITYPERCENT) 
Ratio between the total own equity and the total assets 
Start-up´s Proportion of External 
Equity 
(EXTEQUITYPERCENT) 
Ratio between the total external equity and the total 
assets 
Start-up´s Proportion of Debt 
(DEBTPERCENT) 
Ratio between the total debt and the total assets 
Firm Size 
(LNSIZE) 








Dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm has 
copyrights, patents and/or trademarks and 0 otherwise 
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Social Media and Website 
(WEBSITESOCIALMEDIA) 
Dummy variable equalling 1 if the firm has website 
and/or Facebook/Twitter/LinkedIn and 0 otherwise 
Number of Founders 
(LNNRFOUNDERS) 




Natural logarithm of the start-up’s age 
Previous Accelerators 
(PREVACCELERATED) 
Dummy variable equalling 1 if the start-up has been 
accelerated before and 0 otherwise 
Profitability 
(profitability_dum1): dummy variable codded 1 for 
profitability between 0% and 5%; 
(profitability_dum2): dummy variable codded 1 for 
profitability between 6% and 10%; 
(profitability_dum3): dummy variable codded 1 for 
profitability between 11% and 15%; 
(profitability_dum4): dummy variable codded 1 for 
profitability between 16% and 20%; 
(profitability_dum5): dummy variable codded 1 for 
profitability higher than 20%; 
(profitability_dum6): dummy variable codded 1 for 
negative ROI); 
and 0 otherwise. 
Founders’ Gender 
(LNMALE) 




Dummy variable equalling 1 if, at least, one founder 
per firm reported entrepreneurial experience and 0 
otherwise 




Table 4: Descriptive statistics at the start-up’s level 
 Observations Percent Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Accepted       
0 2,729 79.47% - - - - 
1 705 20.53% - - - - 
Total 3,434 100% - - - - 
Own Equity ($) 3,434 - 144,884.2 1,761,877 0 70,000,000 
Outside Equity ($) 3,434 - 337,975.9 10,700,000 0 517,000,000 
Debt ($) 3,434 - 137,045 2,907,184 0 122,000,000 
Own Equity (%) 3,434 - 62.90 48.31 0 1 
External Equity (%) 3,434 - 3.35 17.99 0 1 
Debt (%) 3,434 - 1.71 13 0 1 
Size 3,434 - 33 1,055.26 0 56,500 
Revenues ($) 3,434 - 292,913.3 4,885,584 0 203,000,000 
Intellectual Property       
0 1,615 47.03% - - - - 
1 1,819 52.97% - - - - 
Total 3,434 100% - - - - 
Website/Social Media       
0 359 10.45% - - - - 
1 3,075 89.55% - - - - 
Founders’ Job Experience 
(JOBEXPER) 
Dummy variable equalling 1 if, at least, one founder 
per firm, reported previous job experience and 0 
otherwise 
Founders’ Education Level 
(Higheducation): dummy variable codded 1 for start-
ups which reported, at least, one founder with 
bachelor/master/doctoral degree; 
(Mediumeducation): dummy variable codded 1 for 
start-ups in which founders reported 
highschool/vocational degree as the highest education 
level completed; 
(Loweducation): dummy variable codded 1 for 
founders who elementary/primary school is the 
highest level of education completed;  
and 0 otherwise 
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Total 3,434 100% - - - - 
Number of Founders 3,434 - 3 2.95 1 103 
Start-up´s Age 3,434 - 2.67 3.2 0 37 
Prior Accelerators       
0 2,169 63.16% - - - - 
1 1,265 36.84% - - - - 
Total 3,434 100% - - - - 
Sector of Activity       
Agriculture 586 17.06% - - - - 
Artisanal 77 2.24% - - - - 
Culture 36 1.05% - - - - 
Education 528 15.38% - - - - 
Energy 202 5.88% - - - - 
Environment 149 4.34% - - - - 
Financial Services 408 11.88% - - - - 
Health 370 10.77% - - - - 




292 8.50% - - - - 
Infrastructure/facilities 
development 
32 0.93% - - - - 
Other 488 14.21% - - - - 
Supply Chain Services 67 1.95% - - - - 
Technical Assistance 
Services 
34 0.99% - - - - 
Tourism 66 1.92% - - - - 
Water 52 1.51% - - - - 
Total 3,434 100% - - - - 
Profitability       
0%-5% 922 26.85% - - - - 
6%-10% 279 8.12% - - - - 
11%-15% 211 6.14% - - - - 
16%-20% 261 7.60% - - - - 
>20% 451 13.13% - - - - 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics at founders’ level 
 Observations Percent Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Age of Founders 
(years) 
3,434 - 35.6 8.76 20 69 
Gender of Founders 7,737 100% - - - - 
Male 5,717 72.03% 1.6 0.94 0 3 
Female 2,220 27.97% 0.65 0.75 0 3 




      
0 1,132 32.96% - - - - 
1 2,302 67.04% - - - - 
Total 3,434 100% - - - - 
Previous Job 
Experience 
      
0 276 8.04% - - - - 
1 3,158 91.96% - - - - 
Total 3,434 100% - - - - 
Education Level       
High 3,131 91.17% - - - - 
Medium 295 8.59% - - - - 
Low 8 0.23% - - - - 
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Table 6- Impact of the total amount of own equity, external equity and debt on the 
probability of the start-up being accepted in accelerators 
 Logit Probit 
VARIABLES accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted 
lntotalownequity 0.047** 0.038* 0.038* 0.029*** 0.023** 0.023* 
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
lntotalexternalequity 0.080*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
lntotaldebt 0.037** 0.026* 0.027* 0.022*** 0.016* 0.016* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
lnsize  0.009 0.005  0.007 0.006 
  (0.065) (0.066)  (0.038) (0.038) 
lnrev  0.057*** 0.056***  0.032*** 0.032*** 
  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.009) (0.009) 
intproperty  -0.215* -0.215*  -0.117* -0.114 
  (0.123) (0.125)  (0.070) (0.071) 
websitesocialmedia  0.623** 0.571**  0.322** 0.298** 
  (0.261) (0.261)  (0.142) (0.142) 
lnnrfounders  -0.072 -0.141  -0.042 -0.082 
  (0.099) (0.108)  (0.055) (0.060) 
lnagestartup  -0.179* -0.166*  -0.100* -0.095* 
  (0.097) (0.097)  (0.055) (0.056) 
prevaccelerated  0.363*** 0.344***  0.205*** 0.194*** 
  (0.117) (0.119)  (0.066) (0.066) 
profitability_dum1  -0.178 -0.147  -0.099 -0.083 








  (0.239) (0.248)  (0.134) (0.137) 
profitability_dum3  -0.199 -0.167  -0.101 -0.084 

















  (0.191) (0.192)  (0.104) (0.105) 
lnmale   0.239**   0.132** 
   (0.109)   (0.061) 
entrepexper   -0.026   -0.017 
   (0.127)   (0.073) 
jobexper   -0.230   -0.130 
   (0.230)   (0.128) 
higheduc   14.439***   5.251*** 
   (0.649)   (0.206) 
mediumeduc   13.910***   4.953*** 













 (0.588) (0.780) (1.007) (0.332) (0.435) (0.480) 
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Observations 3,019 3,019 3,019 3,019 3,019 3,019 
r2_p 0.180 0.197 0.202 0.181 0.197 0.202 
Note: The table evaluates the impact of the start-up’s level of capital (own equity, external equity and debt),  
the impact of several start-up’s characteristics (country of headquarters, social media and website, 
intellectual property, previous accelerators, number of founders, revenues, and size) and founders’ 
characteristics (age of founders, gender, previous entrepreneurial experience, previous job experience and 
education level) on the probability of the start-up being accepted in accelerators. All regressions include 
controls for fixed effects at program accelerator and country headquarters. Robust standard errors with 
clusters for accelerator program, for the Logit and Probit estimates, are in parentheses. ***Statistical 
significance at 1%, **statistical significance at 5%, *statistical significance at 10%. 
 
Table 7- Impact of a start-up´s capital structure on the probability of the start-up being 
accepted in accelerators: Logit model 
VARIABLES accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted 
externalequitypercent 0.431* 0.358 0.350 0.134 0.158 0.148 
 (0.238) (0.222) (0.226) (0.245) (0.231) (0.236) 
ownequitypercent    -0.576*** -0.410*** -0.416*** 
    (0.120) (0.129) (0.132) 
debtpercentage -0.366 -0.390 -0.442    
 (0.419) (0.420) (0.434)    
lnsize  0.068 0.063  0.041 0.035 
  (0.063) (0.064)  (0.064) (0.065) 
lnrev  0.070*** 0.069***  0.065*** 0.063*** 
  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) 
intpropert  -0.142 -0.144  -0.177 -0.179 
  (0.124) (0.126)  (0.121) (0.123) 
websitesocialmedia  0.681** 0.624**  0.670** 0.608** 
  (0.264) (0.262)  (0.267) (0.264) 
lnnrfounders  -0.016 -0.107  -0.041 -0.124 
  (0.093) (0.103)  (0.097) (0.106) 
lnagestartup  -0.125 -0.108  -0.142 -0.126 
  (0.092) (0.092)  (0.092) (0.093) 
prevaccelerated  0.395*** 0.379***  0.375*** 0.356*** 
  (0.115) (0.116)  (0.115) (0.117) 
profitability_dum1  -0.281** -0.250*  -0.232* -0.199 
  (0.133) (0.135)  (0.139) (0.141) 
profitability_dum2  -0.767*** -0.722***  -0.730*** -0.689*** 
  (0.241) (0.248)  (0.241) (0.249) 
profitability_dum3  -0.345 -0.305  -0.295 -0.258 
  (0.235) (0.240)  (0.238) (0.244) 
profitability_dum4  -0.844*** -0.822***  -0.788*** -0.763*** 
  (0.207) (0.212)  (0.216) (0.222) 
profitability_dum5  -0.685*** -0.665***  -0.604*** -0.585*** 
  (0.184) (0.186)  (0.185) (0.186) 
lnmale   0.279**   0.260** 
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   (0.109)   (0.109) 
entrepexper_dum2   -0.018   -0.013 
   (0.127)   (0.126) 
jobexper_dum2   -0.116   -0.152 
   (0.227)   (0.228) 
higheduc_dum2   15.066***   16.078*** 
   (0.610)   (0.622) 
mediumeduc_dum2   14.541***   15.554*** 
   (0.537)   (0.543) 
Constant -2.256*** -3.108*** -18.093*** -1.890*** -2.742*** -18.681*** 
 (0.610) (0.779) (0.991) (0.619) (0.804) (1.025) 
Observations 3,019 3,019 3,019 3,019 3,019 3,019 
r2_p 0.159 0.185 0.191 0.168 0.189 0.194 
Note: The table evaluates the impact of the start-up’s level of capital (own equity, external equity and debt),  
the impact of several start-up’s characteristics (country of headquarters, social media and website, 
intellectual property, previous accelerators, number of founders, revenues, and size) and founders’ 
characteristics (age of founders, gender, previous entrepreneurial experience, previous job experience and 
education level) on the probability of the start-up being accepted in accelerators. All regressions include 
controls for fixed effects at program accelerator and country headquarters. Robust standard errors with 
clusters for accelerator program, for the Logit estimates, are in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 
1%, **statistical significance at 5%, *statistical significance at 10%. 
 
Table 8- Impact of a start-up´s capital structure on the probability of the start-up being 
accepted in accelerators: Probit model 
VARIABLES accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted 
externalequitypercent 0.239* 0.197 0.197 0.065 0.079 0.078 
 (0.140) (0.130) (0.132) (0.144) (0.136) (0.138) 
ownequitypercent    -0.336*** -0.242*** -0.245*** 
    (0.068) (0.073) (0.075) 
debtpercentage -0.208 -0.218 -0.248    
 (0.225) (0.229) (0.235)    
lnsize  0.041 0.039  0.026 0.024 
  (0.036) (0.036)  (0.037) (0.037) 
lnrev  0.039*** 0.038***  0.036*** 0.036*** 
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) 
intproperty  -0.078 -0.077  -0.097 -0.096 
  (0.070) (0.071)  (0.069) (0.070) 
websitesocialmedia  0.354** 0.327**  0.344** 0.314** 
  (0.143) (0.143)  (0.144) (0.143) 
lnnrfounders  -0.013 -0.067  -0.027 -0.076 
  (0.052) (0.058)  (0.054) (0.060) 
lnagestartup  -0.064 -0.056  -0.076 -0.069 
  (0.052) (0.052)  (0.053) (0.053) 
prevaccelerated  0.225*** 0.214***  0.211*** 0.200*** 
  (0.064) (0.065)  (0.065) (0.066) 
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profitability_dum1  -0.157** -0.141*  -0.128 -0.112 
  (0.074) (0.075)  (0.078) (0.079) 
profitability_dum2  -0.444*** -0.416***  -0.422*** -0.396*** 
  (0.134) (0.136)  (0.134) (0.137) 
profitability_dum3  -0.191 -0.170  -0.158 -0.138 
  (0.126) (0.129)  (0.127) (0.130) 
profitability_dum4  -0.470*** -0.455***  -0.432*** -0.416*** 
  (0.115) (0.117)  (0.119) (0.122) 
profitability_dum5  -0.365*** -0.355***  -0.318*** -0.309*** 
  (0.100) (0.101)  (0.100) (0.101) 
lnmale   0.158***   0.146** 
   (0.061)   (0.061) 
entrepexper_dum2   -0.011   -0.011 
   (0.073)   (0.072) 
jobexper_dum2   -0.062   -0.082 
   (0.126)   (0.127) 
higheduc_dum2   5.071***   5.271*** 
   (0.164)   (0.185) 
mediumeduc_dum2   4.776***   4.976*** 
   (0.128)   (0.149) 
Constant -1.284*** -1.813*** -6.841*** -1.080*** -1.592*** -6.789*** 
 (0.342) (0.441) (0.452) (0.344) (0.453) (0.462) 
Observations 3,019 3,019 3,019 3,019 3,019 3,019 
r2_p 0.159 0.185 0.190 0.168 0.188 0.194 
Note: The table evaluates the impact of the start-up’s level of capital (own equity, external equity and debt),  
the impact of several start-up’s characteristics (country of headquarters, social media and website, 
intellectual property, previous accelerators, number of founders, revenues, and size) and founders’ 
characteristics (age of founders, gender, previous entrepreneurial experience, previous job experience and 
education level) on the probability of the start-up being accepted in accelerators. All regressions include 
controls for fixed effects at program accelerator and country headquarters. Robust standard errors with 
clusters for accelerator program, for the Probit estimates, are in parentheses. ***Statistical significance at 













Appendix 1- Impact of the total amount of own equity, external equity and debt on the 
probability of the start-up being accepted in accelerators: LPM  
VARIABLES accepted_dum2 accepted_dum2 accepted_dum2 
lntotalownequity 0.007** 0.005* 0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
lntotalexternalequity 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
lntotaldebt 0.005** 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
lnsize  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
lnrev  0.007*** 0.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
intproperty_dum2  -0.024 -0.024 
  (0.015) (0.016) 
websitesocialmedia_dum2  0.056** 0.051** 
  (0.026) (0.026) 
lnnrfounders  -0.006 -0.013 
  (0.012) (0.013) 
lnagestartup  -0.021* -0.020* 
  (0.011) (0.011) 
prevaccelerated_dum2  0.043*** 0.041*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) 
profitability_dum1  -0.023 -0.021 
  (0.018) (0.018) 
profitability_dum2  -0.063** -0.059** 
  (0.028) (0.028) 
profitability_dum3  -0.029 -0.024 
  (0.027) (0.028) 
profitability_dum4  -0.074*** -0.070*** 
  (0.025) (0.025) 
profitability_dum5  -0.059** -0.057** 
  (0.024) (0.023) 
lnmale   0.027** 
   (0.013) 
entrepexper_dum2   -0.008 
   (0.015) 
jobexper_dum2   -0.025 
   (0.026) 
higheduc_dum2   0.353*** 
   (0.081) 
mediumeduc_dum2   0.295*** 
   (0.072) 
Constant -0.604*** -0.693*** -1.005*** 
 (0.150) (0.135) (0.140) 
Observations 3,434 3,434 3,434 





Appendix 2- Impact of a start-up’s capital structure on the probability of the start-up 
being accepted in accelerators: LPM  
VARIABLES accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted accepted 
Externalequitypercent 0.060 0.048 0.047 0.020 0.022 0.021 
 (0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) 
Ownequitypercent    -0.071*** -0.049*** -0.049*** 
    (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
debtpercentage -0.043 -0.041 -0.045    
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)    
Lnsize  0.008 0.008  0.004 0.004 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
lnrev  0.009*** 0.008***  0.008*** 0.008*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
intproperty  -0.015 -0.015  -0.019 -0.019 
  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) 
Websitesocialmedia  0.061** 0.056**  0.060** 0.055** 
  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.026) (0.026) 
Lnnrfounders  0.000 -0.010  -0.002 -0.012 
  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.013) 
Lnagestartup  -0.015 -0.014  -0.017 -0.015 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) 
prevaccelerated  0.048*** 0.046***  0.045*** 0.043*** 
  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.015) (0.015) 
profitability_dum1  -0.037** -0.035**  -0.031* -0.029 
  (0.017) (0.017)  (0.017) (0.018) 
profitability_dum2  -0.084*** -0.079***  -0.078*** -0.074*** 
  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027) 
profitability_dum3  -0.049* -0.043  -0.042 -0.036 
  (0.027) (0.028)  (0.027) (0.028) 
profitability_dum4  -0.095*** -0.090***  -0.087*** -0.082*** 
  (0.024) (0.024)  (0.025) (0.025) 
profitability_dum5  -0.084*** -0.081***  -0.074*** -0.072*** 
  (0.023) (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023) 
lnmale   0.033**   0.031** 
   (0.013)   (0.013) 
entrepexper   -0.005   -0.005 
R-squared 0.271 0.281 0.284 
r2_a 0.212 0.220 0.223 
Rss 408.7 402.9 400.9 
Mss 151.6 157.3 159.4 
Rmse 0.359 0.357 0.356 
r2 0.271 0.281 0.284 
df_r 127 127 127 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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   (0.015)   (0.015) 
jobexper   -0.013   -0.017 
   (0.026)   (0.026) 
higheduc   0.347***   0.358*** 
   (0.074)   (0.079) 
mediumeduc   0.288***   0.299*** 
   (0.065)   (0.069) 
Constant -0.493*** -0.650*** -0.970*** -0.452*** -0.603*** -0.930*** 
 (0.162) (0.142) (0.145) (0.155) (0.139) (0.145) 
Observations 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,434 3,434 
R-squared 0.254 0.271 0.275 0.260 0.274 0.278 
r2_a 0.195 0.210 0.213 0.201 0.213 0.216 
Rss 417.8 408.3 406.1 414.6 406.9 404.8 
Mss 142.5 152.0 154.2 145.7 153.3 155.5 
Rmse 0.363 0.359 0.358 0.361 0.358 0.358 
r2 0.254 0.271 0.275 0.260 0.274 0.278 
df_r 127 127 127 127 127 127 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
